The antinomy of teleological judgment is one of the most controversial passages of Kant’s "Critique of the Power of Judgment". Having developed the idea of an explanation of organized beings by mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 61-68, in §§ 69-78 Kant raises the question of whether higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the particular empirical laws of organized beings, might pose an antinomy of conflicting principles within the power of judgment. I will argue (...) against alternative views that this antinomy is neither a conflict between objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment nor a conflict between an objective constitutive principle of the determining power of judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of the reflecting power of judgment nor does it consist in a confusion of a pair of subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment with a pair of objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment, but does consist in an apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological natural laws as subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment. I will further argue that Kant’s resolution of the antinomy consists in the regulative idea of a supersensible that represents the unity of both kinds of natural laws and justifies the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. Kant uses three notions when he talks about the supersensible – the regulative idea of a divine artisan, the regulative idea of a divine intuitive understanding, and the regulative idea of an underdetermined, supernatural ground of nature. I will show how each of these notions accounts for the unity of both kinds of natural laws and will discuss possible correlations between them. I will then explain how the unity of both kinds of natural laws in the regulative idea of a supersensible accounts for the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. While the divine intuitive understanding is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of a representation of the unity of both kinds of natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created; it is capable only of the representation of the unification of both kinds of natural laws in form of a hierarchy of laws. (shrink)

Kit Fine has reawakened a puzzle about variables with a long history in analytic philosophy, labeling it “the antinomy of the variable”. Fine suggests that the antinomy demands a reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematics, natural language semantics, and first-order logic. The difficulty arises because: (i) the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ cannot be synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence, but (ii) there is a strong temptation to say that distinct (...) variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ always agree in meaning. We offer a precise interpretation of the challenge posed by (i) and (ii). We then develop some neglected passages of Tarski to show that his semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics. (shrink)

The antinomy of teleological judgment has increasingly been understood as a conflict between regulative principles. But it is not clear why regulative principles can be in conflict at all, since Kant otherwise takes the realization that two conflicting principles are regulative to be sufficient to resolve an antinomy. I argue that in Kant’s view regulative principles do not conflict with one another only if they are reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. Given that the principles of this (...) class='Hi'>antinomy do conflict, they must not be reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. I argue that teleology is thus not reducible to reason’s interest because it is fundamentally unlawful. I then use this irreducibility to account for Kant’s appeal to the supersensible in this context. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive account of Kant’s development from the 1755/56 metaphysics to the cosmological antinomy of 1781. With the Theory of the Heavens (1755) and the Physical Monadology (1756), the young Kant had presented an ambitious approach to physical cosmology based on an atomistic theory of matter, which contributed to the foundations of an all-encompassing system of metaphysics. Why did he abandon this system in favor of his critical view that cosmology runs into an antinomy, according (...) to the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)? This book answers this question by focusing on Kant’s methodology and the internal problems of his 1755/56 theory of nature. A decisive role for Kant’s critical turn plays the argument from incongruent counterparts (1768), which drew much attention among philosophers of science, though not sufficiently in Kant research. Furthermore, the book analyses the genesis of the cosmological antinomy in the 1770s, the logical structure of the antinomy in the CPR, its relation to transcendental idealism, as explained in the “experiment of pure reason” (1787), and its role for the teleology of human reason. The book is addressed to Kant scholars, philosophers of science, and students of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

Kant resolves the second antinomy by making a striking claim about the compositional structure of spatiotemporal objects: such objects are composed neither of finitely many simples nor of infinitely many material parts all of which are divided in turn. A prominent reading interprets this as a claim about potential infinity: whereas the thesis and antithesis positions hold that objects’ parts are strictly finite in number and actually infinite, respectively, Kant resolves the antinomy by claiming that objects’ parts are (...) merely potentially infinite. Against these approaches, I argue that potential infinity is not the key notion in the antinomy’s resolution, and instead quantitative indeterminacy is: according to Kant, it is indeterminate how many actual parts spatiotemporal objects have, and this is not equivalent to a claim concerning their potential infinity. Kant does not deny that objects’ parts are potentially infinitely numerous, but as I argue, attributions of quantitative indeterminacy and attributions of potential infinity are not the same, and quantitative indeterminacy rather than potential infinity is the key result in the antinomy’s resolution. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that morality obliges us to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. I argue, however, that in two late essays – “The End of All Things” and “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” – Kant provides moral counterarguments to that position: these beliefs undermine moral agency by giving rise to fanaticism or fatalism. Thus, I propose, the Kantian position on the justification of religious belief (...) is ultimately antinomial. One ought, moreover, to understand Kant’s considered position concerning the immortality of the soul and the existence of God to be similar to that he proposes concerning the theoretical ideas of reason in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason: they are necessary as regulative ideas guiding moral action, not endorsed or even postulated as propositions. In other words, they are subject matters not of belief, but of hope. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment is read as a reflection on philosophical methodological problems that arose through the constitution of an independent science of life - biology. This work presents an example of the interconnections between philosophy and the history of science.

The antinomy of future contingents is here understood as a trilemma whose horns are (a) the thesis of the closed past, (b) the thesis of the open future, and (c) the thesis that all events can be represented at any time. The latter thesis can take different forms, like the principle of bivalence or the thesis of divine foreknowledge. Different versions of (c) lead to different versions of the antinomy itself. The antinomy has been formalized. It hasbeen (...) proven that the theses (a), (b), and (c) make up an inconsistent set but are consistent with each other. Possible solutions have been considered. It has been argued that there are only two global solutions to the antinomy: radical determinism (fatalism) and retroactive causality. The latter solution has been recommended and developed. (shrink)

The article analyzes responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by philosophers on the left, like Balibar and Zizek, and feminist philosophers, such as Butler and Hark. A large-scale war in Europe proved to be a challenge for a number of feminist, pacifist, and leftist certainties, and this challenge was presented in philosophy and feminist theory as a series of antinomies that do not imply a simple solution. Some leading contemporary philosophers believe that Ukraine should stop resisting aggression in the (...) face of the threat of a world nuclear war or if the conflict turns into a war of extermination. An alternative solution was suggested by some left and feminist philosophers who argued that a true Ukrainian victory over an authoritarian aggressor would amount to preserving and empowering democracy in Ukraine, and that this was possible only on the basis of building broad transnational anti-Putin alliances, including alliances with the representatives of all forces opposing Putin in Russia and Belarus. (shrink)

English summary: What minimal philosophical requirements must be considered in order to be able to arrive at an ontologically and epistemologically realist position, with which one is finally able to speak about something like objective empirical knowledge or even an objective science? On the basis of Schopenhauers antinomy of human cognition, and through an introduction and analysis of his philosophical system based on his chief work The World as Will and Representation, a philosophical path is pointed out in this (...) work, which presents the possibility that such an ontologically and epistemologically realist position can be created in the form of an evolutionary realism and representationism, so that one is able to argue under exact systemic requirements for the existence of objective empirical knowledge and with it, finally arrive at an objective science. German description: Welche philosophischen Minimalvoraussetzungen muss man in Betracht ziehen, um zu einer ontologisch- und epistemologisch-realistischen Position gelangen zu konnen, mit der man letztendlich von so etwas wie objektivem empirischem Wissen oder gar von objektiver Wissenschaft sprechen kann? Ausgehend von Schopenhauers Antinomie des menschlichen Erkenntnisvermogens wird durch eine Einfuhrung und Analyse seines philosophischen Systems anhand seines Hauptwerks "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" ein philosophischer Weg aufgezeigt, der die Moglichkeit darlegt, eine derartige ontologisch- und epistemologisch-realistische Position in Form eines evolutionaren Realismus und Reprasentationismus so ausformulieren zu konnen, dass man damit unter bestimmten Systemvoraussetzungen fur die Existenz von objektivem empirischem Wissen und damit letztendlich fur eine objektive Wissenschaft argumentieren kann. (shrink)

The present article focuses on the antinomy of pure practical reason and the deduction of the Highest Good in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason (in the second Critique). Although Kant claims that the Dialectic contains both the antinomy and the deduction, the boundaries dividing one from the other are at best vague. It is difficult to make out where the antinomy of practical reason ends and where the deduction begins. To locate both and to distinguish one (...) from the other (with special attention paid to the modality of the Highest Good) are the chief aims of this article. Additionally but no less importantly, I show, against the line of criticism originally traceable to Schopenhauer, that the antinomy of practical reason amounts to more than a reflection of Kant’s “architectonic obsession.” Not only does the antinomy of practical reason correspond to a genuine dialectical problem in the Critique of Practical Reason, but it also shares a fundamental (even if not immediately apparent) similarity with the antinomy of pure speculative reason. Finally, I consider Kant’s transcendental deduction of the Highest Good against the backdrop of his other deductions, especially the deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, and defend it against the charge of potential circularity. (shrink)

This paper explores the tensions that arise in applying our received notions of artistic creation and credit to AI-generated art. Focusing on AI-generated images, I articulate an “antinomy of artificial art”—a contradiction between three plausible propositions: (1) AI-aided images can count as works of art, (2) All artworks have artists, and (3) AI-aided images don’t (clearly) have artists. To support (3), I argue that, in the case of many AI-aided works, none of the potential candidates—the AI system itself, its (...) programmers, the creators of training images, or the human prompter—can be unproblematically credited as artist. I explore three intriguing responses to this antinomy: treating the prompter as an institutional artist, crediting the AI as a creative agent, and viewing AI–human collaboration as an artistic collective. While each approach shows promise, I argue that none succeeds. If I’m right, current generative AIs inhabit a sort of conceptual limbo. They are “super-tools” possessing sophisticated generative capacities but lacking the robust intentionality and normative responsiveness required for prototypical artistic creation. The tension they expose in our conceptual scheme can’t be resolved through further empirical or theoretical investigation, I suggest. Rather it will be resolved through a socially-driven revision of our artistic concepts and institutions as we adjust them to our developing AI-aided artistic practices. (shrink)

Recent studies on the social representation of a judge’s dignity (Smejkalová et al., 2022, 2024) reveal that it is expressed through a distinct public persona (Goffman, 1954). The core elements of this persona include two seemingly contradictory themes: _Asceticism_ — where a judge is depicted as detached, formal, and restrained — and _Humanity_ — where a judge is open, empathetic, and tolerant. These opposing qualities form a significant conceptual tension. At first, it may seem paradoxical for a judge to embody (...) both detachment and empathy. However, Marková (2003) explains that such tensions are fundamental to social representations, as they arise from conflicting ideas and images generated through human communication. This paper explores these findings through the lens of Marková’s concept of dialogicality, suggesting that understanding the concept of a dignity of a judge in legal practice requires recognizing these inherent conflicts and their ad hoc resolutions. By examining the apparent contradiction between _Asceticism_ and _Humanity_, I will contextualize these themes within the specific framework of the Czech legal system and its approach to constructing judicial legitimacy. This involves applying Loth’s (2007) theory of input/output legitimacy, as adapted by Smejkalová (2021) for the Czech judiciary. The aim is to provide a new interpretive framework that expands on Smejkalová et al.’s (2024) findings and highlights the necessity of using social representation theory to understand the social dimensions of legal meaning, including the “legal scene” in which the meaning-making tensions are manifested and negotiated. (shrink)

This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be (...) at odds with the social cohesion of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this antinomy. (shrink)

In this short paper, I make the case that Kant did not hold the adversarial view of Pyrrhonian skepticism which has sometimes been attributed to him. I show that Kant’s critical method in the Critique of Pure Reason, rather than competing with the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical method to find a more satisfying solution to pure reason’s internal conflicts, instead works alongside the skeptical method to produce a mutually agreeable resolution to the disputes of pure reason, and that this resolution turns out (...) to be far more Pyrrhonian than Kant initially lets on. I begin by piecing together Kant’s interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism (referred to here as "mitigated Pyrrhonism"), which he sees as a moderate form of skepticism that does not aim to undermine the possibility of knowledge or certainty in general and that concedes that we often have adequate reason to stop suspending judgment and endorse a belief over another incompatible belief. I then show that Kant’s critical method in the Antinomies is not meant to provide a general refutation of Pyrrhonian skeptical arguments from equipollence. Instead, it offers a tacit endorsement of the mitigated Pyrrhonist’s procedure as both a method for identifying the limits of human knowledge and a means of attaining knowledge within those limits. The larger project, of which this represents only the first piece, aims to offer a comprehensive Pyrrhonian reading of Kant's critical philosophy which uses the account offered here as its foundation. (shrink)

The antinomy of kitsch comprises two conflicting yet widely accepted claims: first, kitsch and art are incompatible; secondly, some art is kitsch. The key to solving this contradiction is distinguishing between kitsch as an aesthetic category and an aesthetic, art-critical property. As an aesthetic category, kitsch is an artifact, performance, or practice whose dominant function is to enable self-enjoyment by effortlessly evoking emotional reactions of the “soft” emotional spectrum with a “sweet” phenomenological quality in a large group of people. (...) Based on this definition, kitsch and art are two mutually exclusive aesthetic categories. As an aesthetic property, kitsch is the disposition to effortlessly evoke emotional reactions of the “soft” emotional spectrum with a “sweet” phenomenological quality by supervening on the kitsch typical features. So, everything kitsch is also kitschy, but not vice versa. Therefore, art can be kitschy, although it is not kitsch. (shrink)

In previous work, Gava has argued that Kant’s solution to the third antinomy offers a new model for transcendental arguments, one in which the main purpose is to provide a solution to an antinomy. In this chapter, Gava develops this approach further by considering whether Kant’s solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment fits this model. He begins by making some conceptual distinctions regarding the structure of Kant’s solution. First, it is suggested that in order to properly (...) understand Kant’s solution, one needs to distinguish between two problems. The first problem concerns how we should generally characterize the generation of material things in nature. The second problem concerns how mechanical laws and teleological laws can be unified in a unitary system of natural laws. It is then suggested that once we have distinguished between these two problems, we can read Kant’s solution as proceeding in four steps. Gava shows that interpreters of the antinomy have sometimes talked past each other, because they focused on one or another of these problems and steps. After having provided this reconstruction, it is considered whether the argument can be described as a transcendental argument and of which sort. (shrink)

This volume documents for the first time the enormous variety of diverging interpretations and presents a text-oriented analysis of antinomy and its resolution ...

Logical form has semantic import. Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks) and their synonym interceptions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes) state the same fact but different truths with different explanations. Terms retain objectual reference but its role in explaining truth is preempted by syntax or synonymy. Church’s Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences (GmG: ‘Greeks’ means Greeks), and QTi sentences (p≡it is true that p≡“p” is true) are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Their interceptions alter syntax and modality, yielding contingent truths (GmH: (...) ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes, HmG: ‘Hellenes’ means Greeks). Meta-logical translation preserves syntax (GmG: ‘Greichen’ bedeutet Greichen), not necessarily objectual reference. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing that identifies quotational referent with an intrasentential replica. (shrink)

This article challenges three widespread assumptions about Kant’s argument for the antithesis of the Second Antinomy. The first assumption is that this argument consists of an argument for the claim that “[no] composite thing in the world consists of simple parts”, and a logically independent argument for the claim that “nothing simple exists anywhere in the world”. The second assumption is that when Kant argues that “[no] composite thing in the world consists of simple parts”, he is making a (...) claim about the mereological structure of spatially extended things in particular, as opposed to a claim about the mereological structure of things in general. And the third assumption is that Kant’s argument for this part of the antithesis is based on a claim about the relationship between the size of the extension of a composite thing and the sizes of the extensions of the things of which this composite thing consists. (shrink)

This article discusses the remarkable conversation between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno regarding the relationship between utopia and death. It unpacks the antinomy of death and analyzes the m...

This study argues that there is an internal inconsistency in Badiou’s treatment of art, particularly in how he applies his ontological investigations to literary works. This inconsistency complicates the use of a literary theory derived from his philosophy. By examining Badiou’s encounters with specific literary works, we reveal two distinct yet unexamined descriptions of artistic truth that coexist within his writings. Understanding these dualities allows us to explore how Badiou’s concept of ‘truths’ transcends both temporal and local knowledge systems – (...) such as postmodernism – which may be influential for a time but ultimately fade. The very inconsistency within Badiou’s framework is a strength, as it opens the possibility for two distinct ontological modes of reading literature. This approach broadens the potential for declaring universal ‘truths’ that are both ‘singular’ and ‘immanent’, while applicable to both an infinite “configuration” of literary works and a finite individual work as “pertinent units” of literary criticism. This inconsistency not only helps to challenge and blur the clichéd boundaries between literary schools and epochs but also infuses literary theory – drawn from Badiou’s philosophy – with an anti-identitarian, trans-linguistic, trans-historical, and trans-topological resonance. (shrink)

A given event may be a surprise to you, even if you know that it is going to occur. It may be a surprise to you, even if you know that it is going to occur and be a surprise to you. But what is not possible is that you should know a finite list of possible times at which it may possibly occur, and know that it will be a surprise to you. The article argues that this is sufficient (...) to dispense with the well-known paradox or antinomy, the 'Surprise Test'. (shrink)

This paper examines Kant’s account of the compatibility of transcendental freedom and psychological determinism in the Third Antinomy, and confronts it with contemporary deterministic accounts of agency. I argue that Kant’s solution requires paying due attention to the nature of the empirical character as law of nature, but also relies upon a role for inner sense in agency that can be questioned in the light of contemporary empirical psychology. The paper outlines ways of complementing Kant’s solution so as to (...) address such criticisms. (shrink)

The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of (...) that property. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Kant's third antinomy introduces freedom as the unconditioned cause that allows reason to form a synthesis of causal linkage. What different thinking conditions, I ask, does this antinomy open up for reason even to entertain any possibility of success? Reason's ability to form a synthesis depends on acknowledging the role in Kant's argument of a subject that does not need to be envisioned as a standpoint—whether intelligible or empirical, as Kant's explicit solution has it—but, rather, as the (...) site of a relationship between the series and its outside. We may call it “unconditioned subjectivity,” clarifying from the outset that subjectivity in this sense names a structural position that plays an exceptional role in the series: it is the element that exceptionally introduces a boundary, a fleeting moment of closure. Unconditioned subjectivity would name the relationship and boundary that anchor the phenomenal series time and again. I argue, moreover, that the synthesis of causality forming here coheres as a dynamic system that is not stable or self-contained but, rather, contingent and “in progress.” Perhaps unexpectedly, the potential of this antinomy to form this dynamic system hinges on the fact that its antithesis denies freedom. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the role of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in the “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will reconstruct Kant’s conception of the PSR, drawing from his lectures on logic and the Second Analogy of Experience. Kant distinguished a formal and a material version of this principle. In both cases, the PSR enables the attribution of actuality to propositions (in the case of the logical (...) principle) or objects (in the case of the real principle). However, it will be essential to note that real actuality (existence) cannot be attributed to an object without reference to a possible empirical intuition. Second, I will show that keeping in mind this restriction, which sets the conditions to attribute existence to objects, is essential to understand Kant’s general argument in the Antinomy. In this context, it will be necessary to distinguish between the PSR and the supreme principle of reason. Whereas the former principle is a necessary rule for the possibility of experience, this is not true regarding the latter principle. Third, I will show that the supreme principle is a rule meant to satisfy reason’s logical maxim. (shrink)

"Where is it decreed that enlightenment must be free of emotion? To me, the opposite seems to be true. Enlightenment can properly fulfill its task only if it sets to work with passion." - Améry, At the Mind's Limits This statement, which concludes the preface to the 1977 reissue of At the Mind’s Limits, conveys the philosophical ambition of the book: to advance the enlightenment project, while revising the way we understand this project. The idea, rejected here by Améry, that (...) the enlightenment “must be free of emotion” owes most to its foremost proponent, Immanuel Kant. This paper picks up on this implicit allusion to Kant, and elaborates on Améry’s revision of the enlightenment by making the confrontation between them explicit. (shrink)

Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” (Benacerraf 1973) takes on the form of a well-known dilemma. Either a referential semantics for ordinary language is extended to mathematical language, but then one lapses into platonism, or a reasonable account of mathematical knowledge as a proof activity is put forward, but then no account of mathematical truth as truth is given.

The aim of this paper is to show that there is a genuine difficulty in Kant’s argument regarding the connection between mechanism and teleology. But this difficulty is not the one that is usually underlined. Far from consisting in a contradiction between the first and the third Critique, I argue that the genuine difficulty is intrinsic to the antinomy of reflective judgement: rather than having any hope of resolving anything, it consists in an inescapable conflict. In order to support (...) this claim, I show firstly why converting the thesis of the antinomy about mechanism into reflective judgement does not require renunciation of the universality of causality demonstrated in the first Critique. Then, I suggest that the actual difficulty with Kant’s argument is that there is a genuine conflict inherent in the reflective form of the antinomy. Finally, I examine in detail the antinomy of reflective judgement and compare it to the other Kantian antinomies in order to show that its uniqueness makes it uniquely troubling. This leads me to conclude that the Kantian resolution of the conflict between mechanism and teleology is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

This paper maps out Marcel’s conception of evil onto his fundamental distinction between problem and mystery, shows that the distinction creates two effective methodologies for dealing with evil in the world, draws the antinomy of evil based on these methodologies, and then demonstrates that the antinomy can be dissolved through an existentially engaged, communal encounter with evil and hope. The antinomy between the problem of evil and the mystery of evil is not one to be solved, then, (...) but is one to be dissolved through an encounter with hope. Evil cannot be wholly eradicated when it lacks the objective features of a problem. Evil cannot be reflected upon as a pure mystery, when it produces wholly concrete experiences of suffering. Dissolving the antinomy facilitates Marcel’s vision of transforming the encounter of evil through a love that brings a feeling of hope – for all, regardless of existential or theistic commitment. Hope can act as a “springboard” to existential meaning, wherein the community resides at the very heart of mystery. (shrink)

The second division of Kant’s first Critique is entitled Transcendental Dialectic, and is relatively straightforward. The Analytic explained how knowledge (truth) was constituted, while the Dialectic explains how paralogisms arise and belongs to the second part of the Transcendental Logic. Kant claims that the fundamental mission of epistemology is to prevent knowledge from intruding into domains beyond its proper reach. It is also for this reason that his philosophy is called a critical philosophy.