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Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Confirmation" by Vincenzo Crupi

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Achinstein, P. (ed.), 2005, Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. (Scholar)
Baker, A., 2003, “Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54: 245–259. (Scholar)
Barnes, E.C., 2018, “Prediction versus Accommodation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/prediction-accommodation/>. (Scholar)
Betz, G., 2013, “Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation”, Erkenntnis, 78: 991–1009. (Scholar)
Bird, A., 2010, “Eliminative Abduction—Examples from Medicine”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41: 345–352. (Scholar)
Blok, S.V., D.L. Medin, and D. Osherson, 2007, “Induction as Conditional Probability Judgment”, Memory & Cognition, 35: 1353–1364. (Scholar)
Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann, 2002, “Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments”, Philosophy of Science, 69: 29–72. (Scholar)
Brössel, P., 2013, “The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux”, Philosophy of Science, 80: 378–397. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1950/1962, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Chandler, J., 2007, “Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58: 489–502. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts”, Synthese, 190: 129–138. (Scholar)
Christensen, D., 1997, “What Is Relative Confirmation?”, Noûs, 3: 370–384. (Scholar)
Cleland, C.E., 2011, “Prediction and Explanation in Historical Natural Science”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62: 551–582. (Scholar)
Climenhaga N., 2024, “Epistemic Probabilities Are Degrees of Support, Not Degrees of (Rational) Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108: 153–176. (Scholar)
Craig, W., 1957, “The Uses of the Herbrand-Gentzen Theorem in Relating Model Theory and Proof Theory”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 3: 269–285. (Scholar)
Crupi, V., 2015, “Inductive Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44 (40th anniversary issue): 641–650. (Scholar)
–––, 2025, “The Case of Early Copernicanism: Epistemic Luck vs. Predictivist Vindication ”, in R. Frigg, J. Alexander, L. Hudetz, M. Rédei, L. Ross, and J. Worrall (eds.), The Continuing Influence of Imre Lakatos’s Philosophy: A Celebration of the Centenary of his Birth, Springer, pp. 105–126. (Scholar)
Crupi, V. and K. Tentori, 2010, “Irrelevant Conjunction: Statement and Solution of a New Paradox”, Philosophy of Science, 77: 1–13. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Confirmation as Partial Entailment: A Representation Theorem in Inductive Logic”, Journal of Applied Logic, 11: 364–372 [Erratum in Journal of Applied Logic, 12: 230–231]. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Measuring Information and Confirmation”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 47: 81–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Confirmation Theory”, in A. Hájek and C. Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 650–665. (Scholar)
Crupi, V., N. Chater, and K. Tentori, 2013, “New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64: 189–204. (Scholar)
Crupi, V., R. Festa, and C. Buttasi, 2010, “Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation”, in M. Suárez, M. Dorato, and M. Rédei (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 73–93. (Scholar)
Crupi, V., B. Fitelson, and K. Tentori, 2008, “Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy”, Thinking & Reasoning, 14: 182–199. (Scholar)
Crupi, V., K. Tentori, and M. Gonzalez, 2007, “On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues”, Philosophy of Science 74: 229–52. (Scholar)
Dawes, R.M., 2001, Everyday Irrationality, Boulder (CO): Westview. (Scholar)
De Finetti, B., 2008, Philosophical Lectures on Probability (edited by A. Mura), Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Dorling, J., 1979, “Bayesian Personalism, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, and Duhem’s Problem”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 10: 177–187. (Scholar)
Douglas, H. and P.D. Magnus, 2013, “Why Novel Prediction Matters”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 580–589. (Scholar)
Douven, I., 2017, “Abduction”, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Tracking Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science, 88: 398–414. (Scholar)
Douven, I. and W. Meijs, 2006, “Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative”, Synthese, 149: 97–132. (Scholar)
Duhem, P., 1906, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1991. (Scholar)
Earman, J., 1992, Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1983, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10: Testing Scientific Theories, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Earman, J. and C. Glymour, 1988, “What Revisions Does Bootstrap Testing Need?”, Philosophy of Science, 55: 260–264. (Scholar)
Earman, J. and M. Janssen, 1993, “Einstein’s Explanation of the Motion of Mercury’s Perihelion”, in J. Earman, M. Janssen, and J. Norton (eds.), The Attraction of Gravity: New Studies in the History of General Relativity, Boston: Birkhäuser, pp. 129–172. (Scholar)
Earman, J. and W.C. Salmon, 1992, “The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses”, in M.H. Salmon et al., Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, pp. 42–103. (Scholar)
Easwaran, K., 2011a, “Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor”, Philosophy Compass, 6: 312–320. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “Bayesianism II: Criticisms and Applications”, Philosophy Compass, 6: 321–332. (Scholar)
Eells, E., 1990, “Bayesian Problems of Old Evidence”, in Savage, 1990, pp. 205–223. (Scholar)
Eells, E. and B. Fitelson, 2002, “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support”, Philosophical Studies, 107: 129–42. (Scholar)
Eva, B. and S. Hartmann, 2020, “On the Origins of Old Evidence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98: 481–494. (Scholar)
Festa, R., 1999, “Bayesian Confirmation”, in M. Galavotti and A. Pagnini (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 55–87. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Induction, Probability, and Bayesian Epistemology”, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities, 80: 251–284. (Scholar)
Festa, R. and G. Cevolani, 2017, “Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation: Likelihood and Anti-Likelihood Principles”, Philosophy of Science, 84: 56–81. (Scholar)
Fitelson, B., 1999, “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity”, Philosophy of Science, 66: S362–78. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Putting the Irrelevance Back into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction”, Philosophy of Science, 69: 611–622. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation”, Synthese 156: 473–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Goodman’s New Riddle”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37: 613–643. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z”, Philosophy of Science, 88: 726–730. (Scholar)
Fitelson, B. and J. Hawthorne, 2010, “How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens”, in E. Eells and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 247–276. (Scholar)
Forster, M., 2007, “A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success”, Philosophy of Science, 74: 588–600. (Scholar)
Forster, M. and E. Sober, 1994, “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 1–35. (Scholar)
Franklin, J., 2001, “Resurrecting Logical Probability”, Erkenntnis, 55: 277–305. (Scholar)
Gabbay, D., S. Hartmann, and J. Woods (eds.), 2011, Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 10: Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Scholar)
Gaifman, H., 1979, “Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates, and Hempel’s Ravens”, Erkenntnis, 14: 105–147. (Scholar)
Garber, D., 1983, “Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience”, in Earman, 1983, pp. 99–131. (Scholar)
Gemes, K. 1993, “Hypothetico-Deductivism, Content and the Natural Axiomatization of Theories”, Philosophy of Science, 60: 477–487. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Hypothetico-Deductivism: The Current State of Play; The Criterion of Empirical Significance: Endgame”, Erkenntnis, 49: 1–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete But Not Hopeless”, Erkenntnis, 63: 139–147. (Scholar)
Giere, R.N., 1983, “Testing Theoretical Hypotheses”, in Earman, 1983, pp. 269–298. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, Understanding Scientific Reasoning, Belmont (CA): Thomson / Wadsworth, 2006. (Scholar)
Gillies, D., 1986, “In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument”, Philosophy of Science, 53: 110–113. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus”, in A. Fine and J. Leplin (eds.), Proceedings of the 1988 Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2, East Lansing (MI): Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 381–392. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Philosophical Theories of Probability, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Glass, D.H., 2013, “Confirmation Measures of Association Rule Interestingness”, Knowledge-Based Systems, 44: 65–77. (Scholar)
Glymour, C., 1980a, Theory and Evidence, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1980b, “Hypothetico-Deductivism Is Hopeless”, Philosophy of Science, 47: 322–325. (Scholar)
Good, I.J., 1967, “The White Shoe Is a Red Herring”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17: 322. (Scholar)
–––, 1968, “Corroboration, Explanation, Evolving Probabilities, Simplicity, and a Sharpened Razor”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 19: 123–43. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “46656 Varieties of Bayesians”, American Statistician, 25 (5): 62–63. (Scholar)
Goodman, N., 1955, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983. (Scholar)
Guala, F., 2012, “Experimentation in Economics”, in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, J. Woods, and U. Mäki (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 597–640. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., 2008. “Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59: 793–819. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Interpretations of Probability”, E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret/>. (Scholar)
Hájek, A. and J. Joyce, 2008, “Confirmation”, in S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, New York: Routledge, pp. 115–29. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J., 2005, “Degrees-of-Belief and Degrees-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions”, Mind, 114: 277–320. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Confirmation Theory”, in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, J. Woods, P.S. Bandyopadhyay, and M. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Statistics, Dordrecht: Elsevier, pp. 333–389. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Inductive Logic”, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-inductive/>. (Scholar)
Heckerman, D., 1988, “An Axiomatic Framework for Belief Updates”, in J.F. Lemmer and L.N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 11–22. (Scholar)
Hempel, C.G., 1937, “Le problème de la vérité”, Theoria, 3: 206–246. (Scholar)
–––, 1943, “A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8: 122–143. (Scholar)
–––, 1945, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, Mind, 54: 1–26, 97–121. (Scholar)
Hesse, M. 1975, “Bayesian Methods and the Initial Probabilities of Theories”, in Maxwell and Anderson, 1975, pp. 50–105. (Scholar)
Hitchcock, C. and E. Sober, 2004, “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1–34. (Scholar)
Horvitz, E. and D. Heckerman, 1986, “The Inconsistent Use of Measures of Certainty in Artificial Intelligence Research”, in L.N. Kanal and J.F. Lemmer (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 137–151. (Scholar)
Horwich, P., 1983, “Explanations of Irrelevance”, in Earman, 1983, pp. 55–65. (Scholar)
Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, J., 1940, “On Confirmation”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5: 133–148. (Scholar)
Howson, C., 1990, “Fitting Theory to the Facts: Probably Not Such a Bad Idea After All”, in Savage, 1990, pp. 224–244. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “The ‘Old Evidence’ Problem”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42: 547–555. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Howson, C. and P. Urbach, 2006, Scientific Reasoning. The Bayesian Approach, La Salle (IL): Open Court. (Scholar)
Huber, F., 2008a, “Hempel’s Logic of Confirmation”, Philosophical Studies, 139: 181–189. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “Assessing Theories, Bayes Style”, Synthese, 161: 89–118. (Scholar)
Huber, F. and C. Schmidt-Petri, 2009, Degrees of Belief, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Janssen, M., 2003, “COI Stories: Explanation and Evidence in the History of Science”, Perspectives on Science, 10: 457–522. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, R., 1995, “Probability Reparation: The Problem of New Explanation”, Philosophical Studies, 77: 97–101. (Scholar)
Joyce, J., 2019, “Bayes’ Theorem”, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/bayes-theorem/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Development of Subjective Bayesianism”, in Gabbay, Hartmann, and Woods, 2011, pp. 415–476. (Scholar)
Kelly, K., 2007, “A New Solution to the Puzzle of Simplicity”, Philosophy of Science, 74: 561–573. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Ockham’s Razor, Truth, and Information”, in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, J. Woods, P. Adriaans, and J. van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Information, Dordrecht: Elsevier, pp. 321–360. (Scholar)
Kelly, K. and C. Glymour, 2004, “Why Probability Does Not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification”, in C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, London: Blackwell, pp. 94–114. (Scholar)
Keynes, J., 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
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–––, 1962/1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Kuipers, T., 2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
Kyburg, H.E. and C.M. Teng, 2001, Uncertain Inference, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lakatos, I. and E. Zahar, 1975, “Why did Copernicus’ Research Programme Supersede Ptolemy’s?”, in R.S. Westman (ed.), The Copernican Achievement, Berkeley (CA): University of California Press, pp. 354–383 (reprinted in Lakatos, I., Philosophical Papers I: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 168–192). (Scholar)
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–––, 1997, “How About Bust? Factoring Explanatory Power Back into Theory Evaluation”, Philosophy of Science, 64: 206–216. (Scholar)
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–––, 2004, Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Testing Hypotheses: Prediction and Prejudice”, Science, 307: 219–221. (Scholar)
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–––, 2006, “Confirmation Theory”, in D.M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2^nd edition), Detroit (MI): Macmillan Reference. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Explication of Inductive Probability”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39: 593–616. (Scholar)
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–––, 1996, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2014,“Some Surprising Facts about (the Problem of) Surprising Facts”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 45: 79–86. (Scholar)
Mayo, D. and A. Spanos (eds.), 2010, Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Milne, P., 1996, “\(\Log[P(h\mid eb)/P(h\mid b)]\) Is the One True Measure of Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science, 63: 21–6. (Scholar)
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–––, 2011a, “History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1: 3–27. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, J. Woods, S. Bandyopadhyay, and M. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Statistics, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 391–440. (Scholar)
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–––, 1975, “Confirmation and Relevance”, in Maxwell and Anderson, 1975, pp. 3–36. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Explanation and Confirmation: A Bayesian Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation”, in G. Hon and S.S. Rakover (eds.), Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 61–91. (Scholar)
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