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Author/Editor:Jaromir Benes ; Andrew Berg ; Rafael A Portillo ; David Vávra
Publication Date: January 14, 2013
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Modeling Sterilized Interventions and Balance Sheet Effects of Monetary Policy in a New-Keynesian Framework
Author/Editor:Jaromir Benes ; Andrew Berg ; Rafael A Portillo ; David Vávra
Publication Date: January 14, 2013
B. Central bank behavior
As the central bank adjusts FX reserves it also adjusts the level of unremunerated reserves (not modeled) so as to keep the inter-bank interest rate i at the desired level: Formula (4)
äžå€®éè¡ã¯å€è²šæºåé«ã調æŽãããšããéè¡ééå©ã(4)åŒã®ãããªåœ¢ã§æãŸããã¬ãã«ã«ä¿ã€ããã«ãã¢ãã«åãããŠããªãç¡å ±é ¬æºåé(unremunerated reserves) ã®ã¬ãã«ã調æŽããŸãã
The central bank thus has two operational targets: S^T and i^T.
The levels of these operational targets are set by the exchange rate and interest rate rules that can both takeâin principleâthe general form of a Taylorâtype rule (1): Formula (5)Â Â Â
where Υ is defined as in (2).
For simplicity, we will set Ïs = αs = ÎŽs = 0.
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The central bank tracks the exchange rate operational target by adjusting the quantity of FX reserves in (3), but unless Ï is very large the tracking is not perfect.
By contrast, the interest rate operational target is assumed to be met at all times.
äžå€®éè¡ã¯(3)åŒã®ããã«ã®å€è²šæºåéã調æŽããããšã§çºæ¿ã¬ãŒãæäœç®æšã远åŸããŸãããÏããã»ã©å€§ãããªãéã远åŸã¯å®å šã§ã¯ãããŸããã
ãã®äžæ¹ã§ãé婿äœç®æš(the interest rate operational target)ã¯åžžã«æºãããããã®ãšã¿ãªãããŠããŸãð
Note that our treatment of central bank instruments is not symmetric: for the exchange rate we track movements in the central bank balance sheet, while for interest rates we do not.15
While this is a good description of policy implementation in central banks that run âliteâ inflation targeting regimes, it does not fit the central banks that make decisions about monetary aggregates rather than policy interest rates.16
We take up this issue in appendix A.
äžå€®éè¡ã®éèæ¿çã®æ±ãã¯å¯Ÿç§°çã§ã¯ãªãããšã«æ³šæããŠãã ããïŒ
çºæ¿ã¬ãŒãã«ã€ããŠã¯äžå€®éè¡ã®ãã©ã³ã¹ã·ãŒãã®å€åã远跡ããŸãããéå©ã«ã€ããŠã¯è¿œè·¡ããŸãã(泚15)
ããã¯ããã©ã€ããã€ã³ãã¬ç®æšå¶åºŠ(âliteâ inflation targeting regimes)ãéå¶ããäžå€®éè¡ã®æ¿ç宿œãããŸã説æããŠããŸãã
ãã®æ¿çã¯ãæ¿çéå©ã§ã¯ãªãé貚ç·é¡ã«ã€ããŠæ±ºå®ãäžãäžå€®éè¡ã«ã¯é©åããŸãã(泚16)
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15: This asymmetry reflects central bank practices as well as some underlying economics.
Exchange rate targets are analogous to targets on long-term interest rates, in that both imply setting prices for assets that yield capital gains or losses if prices change and hence that are more subject to speculative attacks than overnight rates (see Woodford (2005) for the case of long rates).
This implies that achieving these targets exactly, as represented by an infinite Ï in (3) may strain central bank balance sheets and be difficult to achieve.
We return to this point later.
For current purposes, however, the implication is that many central banks conduct quantityâbased operations aimed at achieving targets for the exchange rate without necessarily hitting the targets exactly.
Similarly, recent efforts at âquantitative easingâ in developed countries aim to influence but not precisely target long interest rates.
16:On IT âliteâ see Carare and Stone (2003).
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çºæ¿ã¬ãŒãã®ç®æšã¯ãé·æéå©ã®ç®æšãšé¡äŒŒããŠããŸãïŒ
ã©ã¡ãããäŸ¡æ Œãå€åããå Žåã«ãã£ãã¿ã«ã²ã€ã³ãŸãã¯ãã£ãã¿ã«æå€±ãããããè³ç£ã®äŸ¡æ Œèšå®ãæå³ãããããç¿æ¥ç©éå©ãããææ©çæ»æ(speculative attacks)ãåãããããã®ã§ãïŒè©³çްã«ã€ããŠã¯ãWoodford (2005) ãåç
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ããã¯ã(3)ã®ç¡é倧ã®Ïã§è¡šãããããã«ããããã®ç®æšãæ£ç¢ºã«éæãããšãäžå€®éè¡ã®ãã©ã³ã¹ã·ãŒãã«è² æ
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ãã ããçŸåšã®ç®çã§ã¯ãå€ãã®äžå€®éè¡ãå¿
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åæ§ã«ãæè¿ã®ãéçç·©å: âquantitative easingâ ãã®åãçµã¿ããå
é²åœã¯é·æéå©ã«åœ±é¿ãäžããããšãç®æããŠããããæ£ç¢ºã«ã¯é·æéå©ãã¿ãŒã²ããã«ããŠããªãã®ã§ãïŒ
16:ãã©ã€ãããªã€ã³ãã¬ã¿ãŒã²ããæ¿çã«ã€ããŠã¯ãCarare and Stone (2003)ãåç
§ããŠãã ããã
APPENDIX A: Sterilized Intervention in Quantity-Based Monetary Policy
以äžã§ã¯ãæ¬å è¡ç ç©¶ã§è¿°ã¹ãããŠããä»é²Aã®è§£èª¬ãå°ãè¡ããŸãã
This appendix extends the analysis of the main text to the case where the central bank makes decisions about sterilized quantities rather than the interest rate.
The main text assumes the central bank controls the money market rates perfectly at all times by adjusting its sterilizing operations (O) so that the inter-bank rate i is always at the desired (operational target) level i^T . 25
However, these operations are not explicitly present in the model.
This extension is useful for describing the behavior of central banks that do not control market interest rates perfectly, such as money targeting central banks or banks that use âunconventionalâ monetary practices, such as affecting the exchange rate behavior through additional supply of free liquidity (as attempted by Switzerland in 2011).
ãã®ä»é²ã§ã¯ãäžå€®éè¡ãéå©ã§ã¯ãªãäžèåé(sterilized quantities)ã«ã€ããŠæ±ºå®ãäžãå ŽåãŸã§æ¬æã®åæãæ¡åŒµããŸãïŒ
æ¬æã§ã¯ãäžå€®éè¡ãéè¡éã¬ãŒã i ãåžžã«æãŸããïŒæäœç®æšïŒã¬ãã« i^T ã«ãªãããã«ãäžèåæäœã«ãã£ãŠ (O) ã調æŽããããšã§çæéèåžå Žã¬ãŒããåžžã«å®å
šã«å¶åŸ¡ããŠãããšä»®å®ããŠããŸã(泚25)
ãã ãããããã®æäœã¯ã¢ãã«å
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ãã®æ¡åŒµæ©èœã¯ãèªç±æµåæ§ã®è¿œå äŸçµŠãéããŠçºæ¿ã¬ãŒãã®åãã«åœ±é¿ãäžãããªã©ãéäŒçµ±çãªãéèæ¿çã®æ
£ç¿(âunconventionalâ monetary practices)ã䜿çšããäžå€®éè¡ãéè¡ã察象ãšããè³éãªã©ãåžå Žéå©ãå®å
šã«ã¯å¶åŸ¡ããªãäžå€®éè¡ã®åäœãèšè¿°ããã®ã«åœ¹ç«ã¡ãŸãã
(2011幎ã«ã¹ã€ã¹ã詊ã¿ãããã«ïŒ
25:Because in our model the interbank liquidity market always clears, the sterilization rate is the marginal return
on bankâs assets and hence equals the money market rate.
Therefore, the perfect control over sterilization rate
also implies perfect control over money market rates.
泚25ïŒç§ãã¡ã®ã¢ãã«ã§ã¯éè¡éæµåæ§åžå Ž(the interbank liquidity market)ã¯åžžã«æž
ç®ããããããäžèåçãéçåçãšãªãéè¡ã®è³ç£ã«åºã¥ããŠèšç®ãããããšãããçæéèåžå Žã®éå©ãšåãã«ãªããŸãã
ãããã£ãŠãéå°ãªäžèåç(over sterilization rate)ãå®å
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çµæžç ç©¶ãVol.54 No.2 Apr. 2003
ãEffects of the Bank of Japanâs intervention on yen/dollar exchange rate volatilityã21 November 2004
Toshiaki Watanabe (a), Kimie Harada (b)
ãThe Effects of Japanese Foreign Exchange Intervention: GARCH Estimation and Change Point Detectionã
Eric Hillebrand Gunther Schnabl Discussion
Paper No.6 October 2003
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